Abastact：Water theft (WT) jeopardizes equitable water-use rights and potentially threatens the effectiveness and sustainability of irrigation water management. This paper examines whether irrigation-member network size, kinship network size and connections with linking networks affect WT probability and frequency in the local reality characterized by strict water quantity management and weak formal sanctions but conditionally strong informal sanctions. Our empirical analysis applies a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression model and survey data involving 739 households in Awati County, Xinjiang, China. We find that the increasing irrigation member network size decreases WT probability but increases WT frequency, the increasing kinship network size increases WT probability but insignificantly affects WT frequency, and the connection with linking networks insignificantly affects WT probability but increases WT frequency. Consequently, these social network variables contribute little to the local execution of irrigation water management. Our findings’ policy implications and academic contributions are discussed in detail.
Keywords：Irrigation water management; Rural China; Social dilemma; Social networks; Water theft
